Domains of Social Choice Functions on which Coalition Strategy-Proofness and Maskin Monotonicity are Equivalent

It is known that on some social choice and economic domains, a social choice function is coalition strategy-proof if and only if it is Maskin monotonic (e.g. Muller and Satterthwaite, 1977). This paper studies the foundation of those results. I provide a set of conditions which is sufficient for the equivalence between coalition strategy-proofness and Maskin monotonicity. This generalizes some known results.

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Year of publication:	2006-07
Authors:	Takamiya, Koji
Institutions:	Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), Osaka University

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Series:	ISER Discussion Paper.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005023658