Dominant strategy implementability and zero length cycles
Year of publication: |
2021
|
---|---|
Authors: | Edelman, Paul H. ; Weymark, John A. |
Subject: | Dominant strategy incentive compatibility | Implementation theory | Mechanism design | Revenue equivalence | Rochet’s theorem | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice |
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