Double Bertrand competition among intermediaries when consumers can default

This paper models a sequential double price competition among intermediaries when their expected revenue per sale is affected by consumers' default. If this revenue is non-monotonic with the asking price, the Walrasian outcome may not be an equilibrium and demand rationing may emerge instead.

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Year of publication:	2007-02-21
Authors:	Bracoud, Frederique
Published in:	Economics Bulletin. - AccessEcon, ISSN 1545-2921. - Vol. 4.2007, 7, p. 1-16
Publisher:	AccessEcon
Subject:	Bertrand Competition

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	D4 - Market Structure and Pricing ; L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010630267