Double implementation in Nash and strong Nash equilibria

We deal with the implementation problem where agents in some groups can cooperate (or form coalitions) and in some others cannot. We consider a situation where the planner does not know whether agents in a group can cooperate or not. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for a correspondence to be implementable in such a situation.

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Year of publication:	1997
Authors:	Suh, Sang-Chul
Published in:	Social Choice and Welfare. - Springer. - Vol. 14.1997, 3, p. 439-447
Publisher:	Springer

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Extent:	application/pdf application/postscript
Type of publication:	Article
Notes:	Received: 28 February 1995/Accepted: 13 March 1996
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005752955