Dual ownership and risk-taking incentives in managerial compensation
Year of publication: |
2023
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Authors: | Chen, Tao ; Zhang, Li ; Zhu, Qifei |
Published in: |
Review of finance : journal of the European Finance Association. - Oxford : Oxford University Press, ISSN 1875-824X, ZDB-ID 2214390-7. - Vol. 27.2023, 5, p. 1823-1857
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Subject: | CEO compensation | Managerial risk-taking | Shareholder-creditor conflict | Dualownership | Institutional investors | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Führungskräfte | Managers | Institutioneller Investor | Institutional investor | Risikopräferenz | Risk attitude | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Eigentümerstruktur | Ownership structure | Theorie | Theory | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system |
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