Dummy players and the quota in weighted voting games
Year of publication: |
2021
|
---|---|
Authors: | Barthélémy, Fabrice ; Lepelley, Dominique ; Martin, Mathieu ; Smaoui, Hatem |
Published in: |
Group decision and negotiation. - Dordrecht [u.a.] : Springer Science + Business Media B.V., ISSN 1572-9907, ZDB-ID 1478683-7. - Vol. 30.2021, 1, p. 43-61
|
Subject: | Cooperative game theory | Weighted voting games | Dummy player | Probability of voting paradoxes | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Kooperatives Spiel | Cooperative game | Abstimmung | Voting | Wahlverhalten | Voting behaviour |
-
Dynamic programming for computing power indices for weighted voting games with precoalitions
Staudacher, Jochen, (2022)
-
Coalitions and voting power in the Greek Parliament of 2012 : a case-study
Koki, Constandina, (2019)
-
Inconsistent weighting in weighted voting games
Béal, Sylvain, (2022)
- More ...
-
On the likelihood of dummy players in weighted majority games
Barthélémy, Fabrice, (2013)
-
Condorcet's paradox for weak preference orderings
Lepelley, Dominique, (2001)
-
Le système de vote par note à trois niveaux : étude d'un nouveau mode de scrutin
Smaoui, Hatem, (2013)
- More ...