Duopoly Behavior in Asymmetric Markets: An Experimental Evaluation.
Experimental duopolies are analyzed to answer two questions: Are asymmetric duopolies less likely to collude than symmetric duopolies? Is the time it takes to reach an equilibrium affected by asymmetry? In a repeated game where output is the choice , the authors have data for nineteen (respectively, twenty-one) subject pairs where both agents are low-cost (respectively, high-cost) and twenty-five subject pairs where one agent is high-cost and one is low-cost. Subjects make choices for at least thirty-five periods. Results indicate that asymmetric markets are less cooperative and take longer to reach equilibrium than symmetric markets. Copyright 1992 by MIT Press.
Year of publication: |
1992
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Authors: | Mason, Charles F ; Phillips, Owen R ; Nowell, Clifford |
Published in: |
The Review of Economics and Statistics. - MIT Press. - Vol. 74.1992, 4, p. 662-70
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Publisher: |
MIT Press |
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