Dynamic assignment without money: Optimality of spot mechanisms
Year of publication: |
2025
|
---|---|
Authors: | Combe, Julien ; Nora, Vladyslav ; Tercieux, Olivier |
Published in: |
Theoretical Economics. - ISSN 1555-7561. - Vol. 20.2025, 1, p. 255-301
|
Publisher: |
New Haven, CT : The Econometric Society |
Subject: | course allocation | dynamic matching | Market design |
Type of publication: | Article |
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Type of publication (narrower categories): | Article |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 10.3982/TE5419 [DOI] 1920525769 [GVK] |
Classification: | C61 - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis ; C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; d47 ; D61 - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis |
Source: |
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Dynamic assignment without money : optimality of spot mechanisms
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