Dynamic Bargaining over Redistribution with Endogenous Distribution of Political Power

This paper investigates a dynamic capital taxation (and redistribution) problem with an endogenous political power balance. It is shown that the current redistribution, which reduces the future inequality, decreases the future needs for redistribution if the bargaining power is (at least partly) endogenized.

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Year of publication:	2016
Authors:	Saito, Yuta

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Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Saito, Yuta (2016): Dynamic Bargaining over Redistribution with Endogenous Distribution of Political Power.
Classification:	E60 - Macroeconomic Policy Formation, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, Macroeconomic Policy, and General Outlook. General ; E62 - Fiscal Policy; Public Expenditures, Investment, and Finance; Taxation ; H20 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue. General ; H30 - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents. General
Source:	BASE

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015251824