Dynamic climate policy with both strategic and non-strategic agents : taxes versus quantities
Year of publication: |
September 2016
|
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Authors: | Karp, Larry S. ; Siddiqui, Sauleh ; Strand, Jon |
Published in: |
Environmental & resource economics : the official journal of the European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists. - Dordrecht : Springer, ISSN 0924-6460, ZDB-ID 1121258-5. - Vol. 65.2016, 1, p. 135-158
|
Subject: | Dynamic game | Fossil fuel markets | Market power | Climate damages | Nonstrategic fringe | Marktmacht | Ökosteuer | Environmental tax | Klimaschutz | Climate protection | Fossile Energie | Fossil fuel | Dynamisches Spiel | Klimawandel | Climate change | Oligopol | Oligopoly | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
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