Dynamic Collusion and Collusion Games in Knaster’s Procedure

In this paper we study the collusion in Knaster’s procedure, starting from the paper of Fragnelli and Marina (2009). First, we introduce a suitable dynamic mechanism, so that the coalition enlargement is always non-disadvantageous. Then, we define a new class of TU-games in order to evaluate the collusion power of the agents.

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Fragnelli, Vito ; Briata, Federica ; Marco Dall’Aglio
Published in:	Czech Economic Review. - Institut ekonomických studií, ISSN 1802-4696. - Vol. 6.2012, 3, p. 199-208
Publisher:	Institut ekonomických studií
Subject:	Fairness \| Knaster’s procedure \| complete risk aversion \| dynamic coalition formation

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General ; C71 - Cooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010583833