Dynamic commitment games, efficiency and coordination
Year of publication: |
May 2016
|
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Authors: | Dutta, Rohan ; Ishii, Ryosuke |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 163.2016, p. 699-727
|
Subject: | Dynamic commitment | Endogenous timing | Deterrence | Coordination games | Payoff dominance | Stag hunt | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Koordination | Coordination | Experiment |
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