Dynamic contracts when the agent's quality is unknown
Julien Prat, Boyan Jovanovic
| Year of publication: |
September 2014
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Prat, Julien ; Jovanovic, Boyan |
| Published in: |
Theoretical economics : TE ; journal of the Econometric Society. - New York, NY : Econometric Society, ISSN 1933-6837, ZDB-ID 2398911-7. - Vol. 9.2014, 3, p. 865-914
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| Subject: | Principal-agent model | optimal contract | learning | private information | reputation | career | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Vertrag | Contract | Reputation | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Lernprozess | Learning process | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.3982/TE1439 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011717468