Dynamic contracts with random monitoring
Year of publication: |
2019
|
---|---|
Authors: | Barbos, Andrei |
Published in: |
Journal of mathematical economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0304-4068, ZDB-ID 217625-7. - Vol. 85.2019, p. 1-16
|
Subject: | Dynamic contracts | Moral hazard | Optimal contracts | Random monitoring | Moral Hazard | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Leistungsbeurteilung | Employee performance appraisal | Vertrag | Contract |
-
Optimal contracts with random monitoring
Barbos, Andrei, (2022)
-
Frequent monitoring in dynamic contracts
Orlov, Dmitry, (2022)
-
Optimal Monitoring Schedule in Dynamic Contracts
Chen, Mingliu, (2020)
- More ...
-
Information Acquisition and Innovation under Competitive Pressure
Barbos, Andrei, (2009)
-
A Reference Dependent Representation with Subjective Tastes
Barbos, Andrei, (2010)
-
Information Acquisition and Innovation under Competitive Pressure
Barbos, Andrei, (2009)
- More ...