Dynamic Coordination in Efficient and Fair Outcomes : A Developmental Perspective

We study in the laboratory the behavior of children and adolescents (ages 7 to 16) in two repeated coordination games. Reaching the efficient and fair long run outcome (EFO) requires participants to share intentions and beliefs: a coordination of actions in stag hunt, and a coordination of strategies in battle of the sexes. We find in both games a significant increase in the ability to coordinate on the EFO with age, while the majority of participants in all ages adhere to one of a small number of relatively simple strategies. EFO is more prevalent in stag hunt and in the second supergame. This evidence suggests that children gradually learn how to share intentions and beliefs, an ability that can be exported to new interactions, but that is limited by game complexity. More generally, it suggests that dynamic cooperation is not instinctive or innate but rather reflective and acquired