DYNAMIC GAME OF OFFENDING AND LAW ENFORCEMENT: A STOCHASTIC EXTENSION

This article provides an extension of the Fend-Feichtinger-Tragler dynamic game of offending and law enforcement to a stochastic framework. This allows the analysis to reflect actual crime statistics which displays randomness in its distribution. Stochastic paths of crimes are derived. The asymptotic stationary distribution of crime records is also obtained.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2010
Authors:	YEUNG, DAVID W. K. ; ZHANG, YINGXUAN ; YEUNG, PATRICIA M. ; MAK, DEMI
Published in:	International Game Theory Review (IGTR). - World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., ISSN 1793-6675. - Vol. 12.2010, 04, p. 471-481
Publisher:	World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
Subject:	Economics of crime \| law enforcement \| stochastic differential game

Online Resource

Check full text access |

More access options

www.worldscinet.com

Check Google Scholar

In libraries world-wide (WorldCat)

In German libraries (KVK)

subito order

I need help

More details

Extent:	application/pdf text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	B4 - Economic Methodology ; C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods. General ; C6 - Mathematical Methods and Programming ; C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; D5 - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium ; D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making ; M2 - Business Economics
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009018939