Dynamic Incentive Contracts with Sequential Tasks : Compensation Incentive or Termination Threat

We study an incentive problem of sequential tasks in a finite horizon dynamic setting. The principal can choose compensation incentive or termination threat. We characterize the optimal contracts and the principal’s strategy

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Year of publication:	2022
Authors:	Tuo, Mengyao ; Ding, Chuan ; Wang, Ziyue
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Leistungsanreiz \| Performance incentive \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Vertragstheorie \| Contract theory \| Leistungsentgelt \| Performance pay \| Moral Hazard \| Moral hazard \| Managervergütung \| Executive compensation

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (9 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013492124