Dynamic Incentives, Occupational Choice, and the American Dream.

This paper introduces an overlapping generations model of the principal-agent problem. all individuals are workers when young, but have a choice between becoming entrepreneurs or remaining workers when old. Bargaining power and incentive contracts in the principle-agent relationships are determined by market forces.

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Year of publication:	2000
Authors:	Ghatak, M. ; Morelli, M. ; Sjostrom, T.
Institutions:	Department of Economics, Pennsylvania State University
Subject:	MORAL HAZARD \| GENERATIONS \| INFORMATION \| LABOUR \| INCENTIVES

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Series:	Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	39 pages
Classification:	D50 - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium. General ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; J41 - Contracts: Specific Human Capital, Matching Models, Efficiency Wage Models, and Internal Labor Markets
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005631444