Dynamic inconsistency, commitment, and welfare in strategic settings

The choices of a dynamically inconsistent individual depend on whether she commits to consumption ahead of time or chooses consumption in the moment. In individual-choice settings, it is normatively ambiguous whether such an individual's choices with commitment or in the moment are "better". This impasse can be overcome in settings in which dynamically inconsistent individuals interact strategically. Policy implications are discussed.

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Year of publication:	2023
Authors:	Ivanov, Asen
Publisher:	London : Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance
Subject:	dynamic inconsistency \| commitment \| welfare

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Series:	Working Paper ; 954
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	1853587443 [GVK] hdl:10419/284304 [Handle]
Classification:	D60 - Welfare Economics. General ; D90 - Intertemporal Choice and Growth. General
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014480355