Dynamic Managerial Compensation: a Mechanism Design Approach
Year of publication: |
2009-09-01
|
---|---|
Authors: | Garrett, Daniel ; Pavan, Alessandro |
Institutions: | Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science (CMS-EMS), Kellogg Graduate School of Management |
Subject: | dynamic mechanism design | adverse selection | moral hazard | incentives | optimal pay scheme | risk-aversion | stochastic process |
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