Dynamic relational contracts under complete information
Year of publication: |
May 2018
|
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Authors: | Thomas, Jonathan P. ; Worrall, Timothy |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 175.2018, p. 624-651
|
Subject: | Limited commitment | Relational contracts | Risk sharing | Self-enforcement | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Unvollständiger Vertrag | Incomplete contract | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Vertrag | Contract | Risiko | Risk | Vollkommene Information | Complete information | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Risikomanagement | Risk management |
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