Economic Analysis of Contract Law : Incomplete Contracts and Asymmetric Information

by Sugata Bag

1. Introduction -- 2. Basics of Economic Theory of Contract -- 3. Economics of Damage Remedies I: Unilateral Reliance, One-Sided Information Asymmetry -- 4. Economics of Damage Remedies II: Bilateral Reliance, One-Sided Information Asymmetry -- 5. Economics of Damage Remedies III: Incentives Under Expectation Damage With One-Sided Private Information –A Mechanism Design Approach -- 6. Economics of Damage Remedies IV: Incomplete Contracts, Bilateral Reliance, Two-Sided Asymmetric Information -- 7. Concluding Notes.

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Year of publication:	2018
Authors:	Bag, Sugata
Publisher:	Cham : Springer International Publishing
Subject:	Unvollständiger Vertrag \| Incomplete contract \| Asymmetrische Information \| Asymmetric information \| Mechanismus-Design-Theorie \| Mechanism design \| Vertragstheorie \| Contract theory

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Extent:	Online-Ressource (XVI, 203 p. 2 illus. in color, online resource)
Series:	SpringerLink / Bücher Springer eBook Collection
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
ISBN:	978-3-319-65268-9 ; 978-3-319-65267-2 ; 978-3-319-87987-1
Other identifiers:	10.1007/978-3-319-65268-9 [DOI]
Classification:	Betriebswirtschaft: Allgemeines
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013341706