Intro -- ECONOMIC CRISES AS A RESULT OF DISTRUST -- TABLE OF CONTENTS -- PREFACE -- CHINESE FOREIGN EXCHANGE INTERVENTIONS -- EXECUTIVE SUMMARY -- I. INTRODUCTION -- II. HOW ECONOMIC FACTORS DETERMINE EXCHANGE RATES AND INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTS -- III. MASSIVE INTERVENTION SINCE 2000 -- IV. ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES -- A. Effects on China -- B. Effects on the United States -- V. DANGERS AHEAD -- VI. CONCLUSION -- APPENDIX: WHAT ARE INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTS? -- End Notes -- FINANCIAL CRISIS: LESSONS FROM CHILE -- SUMMARY -- COMPARING FINANCIAL CRISES -- THE CHILEAN BANKING CRISIS OF 1981-84 -- THE GOVERNMENT RESPONSE -- Debt Restructuring -- Restoring Bank Balance Sheets -- Restructuring Distressed Banks -- POSSIBLE LESSONS FROM CHILE'S BANK CRISIS -- End Notes -- FINANCIAL CRISIS: LESSONSFROM SWEDEN -- SUMMARY -- BACKGROUND -- DEREGULATION -- THE FINANCIAL CRISIS -- LESSONS LEARNED FROM SWEDEN'S EXPERIENCE -- End Notes -- FINANCIAL MARKET TURMOIL AND U.S. MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE -- SUMMARY -- INTRODUCTION -- EVIDENCE OF TIGHTER CREDIT CONDITIONS -- THE EFFECT OF TIGHTER CREDIT CONDITIONS ON MACROECONOMIC ACTIVITY -- Impact of Tight Credit on Residential Investment -- Impact of Tight Credit on Business Investment -- Impact of Tight Credit on Consumer Spending -- The Effect on Consumer Spending of Falling Asset Values Reducing Household Wealth -- The Double-Edged Influence of the International Sector on GDP -- International Flows of Goods -- International Flows of Capital (Assets) -- AN ESTIMATE OF THE POTENTIAL DRAG ON REAL GDP GROWTH FROM A DIMINISHED FLOW OF CREDIT -- A Simulation of the Effect of a Diminished Credit Flow on Real GDP -- ECONOMIC POLICY RESPONSES TO THE CREDIT CRISIS -- Conventional Macroeconomic Policy -- Monetary Policy -- Fiscal Policy -- The Fed as "Lender of Last Resort" -- Extraordinary Measures (Large Scale Intervention).
