Economic interactions and social tolerance: A dynamic perspective

We propose an evolutionary game to analyse the dynamics of tolerance among heterogeneous economic agents. We show that: (i) intolerance is much more persistent than tolerance; (ii) a fully tolerant society assures prosperity; (iii) cultural integration should precede economic integration.

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Cerqueti, Roy ; Correani, Luca ; Garofalo, Giuseppe
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 120.2013, 3, p. 458-463
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Tolerance \| Replicator dynamics \| Income distribution

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010681756