Effective European Antitrust : Does EC Merger Policy Generate Deterrence?
We estimate the deterrence effects of European Commission (EC) merger policy instruments over the 1990–2009 period. Our empirical results suggest phase-1 remedies uniquely generate robust deterrence as - unlike phase-1 withdrawals, phase-2 remedies, and preventions - phase-1 remedies lead to fewer merger notifications in subsequent years. Furthermore, the deterrence effects of phase-1 remedies work best in high-concentration industries, that is, industries where the Herfindahl Hirschman Index is above the 0.2 cut-off level employed by the EC. Additionally, we find phase-1 remedies do not deter clearly pro-competitive mergers, but do deter potentially anti-competitive mergers in high-concentration industries.
Year of publication: |
2016
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Authors: | Clougherty, Joseph A. ; Duso, Tomaso ; Lee, Miyu ; Seldeslachts, Jo |
Published in: |
Economic Inquiry. - Hoboken : Wiley Periodicals, Inc., ISSN 1465-7295. - Vol. 54.2016, 4, p. 1884-1903
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Publisher: |
Hoboken : Wiley Periodicals, Inc. |
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