Effects of transparency, monetary policy signalling and clarity of central bank communication on disagreement about inflation expectations
Year of publication: |
Februar 2016
|
---|---|
Authors: | Montes, G. C. ; Oliveira, L. V. ; Curi, Andréa Zaitune ; Nicolay, R. T. F. |
Published in: |
Applied economics. - Abingdon : Routledge, ISSN 0003-6846, ZDB-ID 280176-0. - Vol. 48.2016, 7/9, p. 590-607
|
Subject: | Transparency | communication | clarity | disagreement | central bank | Politische Kommunikation | Political communication | Geldpolitik | Monetary policy | Zentralbank | Central bank | Inflationserwartung | Inflation expectations | Kommunikation | Communication | Signalling | Theorie | Theory | Großbritannien | United Kingdom | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information |
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