Efficiency and stability under substitutable priorities with ties
Year of publication: |
2019
|
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Authors: | Erdil, Aytek ; Kumano, Taro |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 184.2019, p. 1-29
|
Subject: | Stability | Efficiency | Matching with indifferences | Substitutable priorities with ties |
Description of contents: | Description [sciencedirect.com] |
Type of publication: | Article |
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Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Corrigendum enthalten in: Volume 203, July 2022, Seite 1-11 |
Other identifiers: | 10.1016/j.jet.2019.104950 [DOI] |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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