Efficiency in a forced contribution threshold public good game

Edward Cartwright and Anna Stepanova

We contrast and compare three ways of predicting efficiency in a forced contribution threshold public good game. The three alternatives are based on ordinal potential, quantal response and impulse balance theory. We report an experiment designed to test the respective predictions and find that impulse balance gives the best predictions. A simple expression detailing when enforced contributions result in high or low efficiency is provided.

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Year of publication:	2015
Authors:	Cartwright, Edward ; Cartwright, Anna
Publisher:	[Canterbury] : Univ. of Kent, School of Economics
Subject:	Public good \| threshold \| impulse balance theory \| quantal response \| forced contribution \| ordinal potential \| Öffentliche Güter \| Public goods \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Experiment \| Nash-Gleichgewicht \| Nash equilibrium

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Extent:	Online-Ressource (28 S.) graph. Darst.
Series:	Discussion papers / University of Kent, School of Economics. - Canterbury : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ZDB-ID 2196631-X. - Vol. 1506
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature ; Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/129984 [Handle]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; H41 - Public Goods ; C92 - Laboratory; Group Behavior
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010513482