Efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in economies with many goods

In this paper, we show that in pure exchange economies where the number of goods equals or exceeds the number of agents, any Pareto-efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanism always allocates the total endowment to some single agent even if the receivers vary.

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Year of publication:	2017
Authors:	Momi, Takeshi
Published in:	Theoretical Economics. - New Haven, CT : The Econometric Society, ISSN 1555-7561. - Vol. 12.2017, 3, p. 1267-1306
Publisher:	New Haven, CT : The Econometric Society
Subject:	Social choice \| strategy-proofness \| Pareto efficiency \| exchange economy

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Type of publication:	Article
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Article
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.3982/TE1792 [DOI] 1003440029 [GVK] hdl:10419/197133 [Handle] RePEc:the:publsh:1792 [RePEc]
Classification:	D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010013