Efficient and strategy-proof social choice when preferences are single-dipped
Year of publication: |
2014
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Authors: | Manjunath, Vikram |
Published in: |
International journal of game theory : official journal of the Game Theory Society. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0020-7276, ZDB-ID 120387-3. - Vol. 43.2014, 3, p. 579-597
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Subject: | Single-dipped preferences | Strategy-proofness | Group strategy-proofness | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function | Präferenztheorie | Theory of preferences | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule |
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