Efficient constitution formation and maintenance: The role of “exit”
A constitution will create mutual gains for all parties only if it is negotiated within an environment in which all parties possess viable exit options. The availability of exit options can substitute for a veil of uncertainty, which is difficult to operationalize in real-world settings. An efficient constitution also will be self-enforcing if it contains rules and principles geared to support political and market competition in the post-constitutional society. Again, the notion of exit is a useful way to characterize this condition for constitutional maintenance. Copyright George Mason University 1992
Year of publication: |
1992
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Authors: | Lowenberg, Anton ; Yu, Ben |
Published in: |
Constitutional Political Economy. - Springer, ISSN 1043-4062. - Vol. 3.1992, 1, p. 51-72
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Publisher: |
Springer |
Saved in:
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