Efficient constrained combinatorial auctions
Year of publication: |
September 2016
|
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Authors: | Lerner, Anat ; Gonen, Rica |
Published in: |
International game theory review. - [River Edge], NJ [u.a.] : World Scientific, ISSN 0219-1989, ZDB-ID 1500913-0. - Vol. 18.2016, 3, p. 1-10
|
Subject: | Budget constraints | efficiency | incentive compatibility | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Effizienz | Efficiency | Budgetrestriktion | Budget constraint | Allokationseffizienz | Allocative efficiency | Technische Effizienz | Technical efficiency | Anreiz | Incentives |
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