Efficient cooperation by exchanging favors
Year of publication: |
September 2018
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Authors: | Olszewski, Wojciech ; Safronov, Mikhail |
Published in: |
Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in economic theory. - Toronto : Wiley, ISSN 1555-7561, ZDB-ID 2220447-7. - Vol. 13.2018, 3, p. 1191-1231
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Subject: | Repeated games | efficiency | chip strategies | Wiederholte Spiele | Effizienz | Efficiency | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Technische Effizienz | Technical efficiency | Gefangenendilemma | Prisoner's dilemma |
Type of publication: | Article |
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Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 10.3982/TE2771 [DOI] hdl:10419/197175 [Handle] |
Classification: | C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; D44 - Auctions ; D61 - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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