Efficient Entry in Competing Auctions

In this paper, we demonstrate the efficiency of seller entry in a model of competing auctions in which we allow for both buyer and seller heterogeneity. This generalizes existing efficiency results in the competitive search literature by simultaneously allowing for nonrival (many-on-one) meetings and private information.

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Albrecht, James ; Gautier, Pieter A. ; Vroman, Susan
Published in:	American Economic Review. - American Economic Association - AEA. - Vol. 104.2014, 10, p. 3288-96
Publisher:	American Economic Association - AEA

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Extent:	application/pdf application/zip
Type of publication:	Article
Notes:	DOI: 10.1257/aer.104.10.3288
Classification:	D44 - Auctions ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010949121