Efficient equilibrium side contracts

We analyze two-stage games where players may make binding offers of schemes for side payment acceptance (or rejection) as well as those for side payments before choosing actions. We find that any set of efficient actions maximizing the total payoff is played on an equilibrium path of the two-stage game when such bilateral contracts on side payments are interdependent.

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Year of publication:	2003
Authors:	Yamada, Akira
Published in:	Economics Bulletin. - AccessEcon, ISSN 1545-2921. - Vol. 3.2003, 6, p. 1-7
Publisher:	AccessEcon

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Language:	English
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005110632