Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in Markets with Compatibility-Based Preferences
Patients needing kidney transplants may have donors who cannot donate to them because of blood or tissue incompatibility. Incompatible patient-donor pairs can exchange donor kidneys with other pairs only when there is a "double coincidence of wants." Developing infrastructure to perform three-way as well as two-way exchanges will have a substantial effect on the number of transplants that can be arranged. Larger than three-way exchanges have less impact on efficiency. In a general model of type-compatible exchanges, the size of the largest exchanges required to achieve efficiency equals the number of types. (JEL C78, I12)
Year of publication: |
2007
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Authors: | Sönmez, Tayfun ; Roth, Alvin E. ; Ünver, M. Utku |
Published in: |
American Economic Review. - American Economic Association - AEA. - Vol. 97.2007, 3, p. 828-851
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Publisher: |
American Economic Association - AEA |
Saved in:
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