Efficient strategy-proof allocation functions in linear production economies

In a linear production model, we characterize the class of efficient and strategy-proof allocation functions, and the class of efficient and coalition strategy-proof allocation functions. In the former class, requiring equal treatment of equals allows us to identify a unique allocation function. This function is also the unique member of the latter class which satisfies uniform treatment of uniforms.

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Year of publication:	1999-10-14
Authors:	Maniquet, François ; Sprumont, Yves
Published in:	Economic Theory. - Springer. - Vol. 14.1999, 3, p. 583-595
Publisher:	Springer
Subject:	Strategy-proofness \| Efficiency \| Linear production set

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Notes:	Received: July 10, 1997 / Revised version: November 24, 1997
Classification:	C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005370920