Efficient Strategy-Proof Allocation Functions in Linear Production Economies

In a linear production model, we characterize the class of efficient and strategy-proof allocation functions, and the class of efficient and coalition strategy-proof allocation functions. In the former class, requiring equal treatment of equals allows us to identify a unique allocation function. This function is also the unique member of the latter class which satisfies uniform treatment of uniforms

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Year of publication:	1999
Authors:	Maniquet, François ; Sprumont, Yves
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Allokation \| Allocation \| Effizienz \| Efficiency \| Produktionsfunktion \| Production function \| Koalition \| Coalition \| Verhandlungstheorie \| Bargaining theory
Description of contents:	Abstract [papers.ssrn.com]

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: Economic Theory, Vol. 14, Iss. 3 Volltext nicht verfügbar
Classification:	C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014179639