Efficient Strategy-Proof Exchange and Minimum Consumption Guarantees

For exchange economies with classical economic preferences, it is shown that any strategy-proof social choice function that selects Pareto optimal outcomes cannot guarantee everyone a consumption bundle bounded away from the origin. This result demonstrates that there is a fundamental conflict between efficiency and distributional goals in exchange economies if the social choice rule is required to be strategy-proof.

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Year of publication:	2002-06
Authors:	Serizawa, Shigehiro ; Weymark, John A.
Institutions:	Vanderbilt University Department of Economics
Subject:	Social choice \| strategy-proofness \| exchange economics

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 0216
Classification:	D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005459255