Efficiently breaking the folk theorem by reliably communicating long term commitments

David Levine

The introduction of artificially intelligent algorithms in pricing decisions by firms has triggered a literature in industrial organization asking if the use of these algorithms will lead to collusive outcomes. In a simple repeated game environment it is shown that if algorithms can be reliably communicated or inferred the folk theorem breaks and the long-run outcome must be collusive.

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Year of publication:	03 February 2024
Authors:	Levine, David K.
Publisher:	London : Centre for Economic Policy Research

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (circa 33 Seiten)
Series:	Discussion papers / CEPR. - London : CEPR, ISSN 2045-6573, ZDB-ID 2001019-9. - Vol. DP18808
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature ; Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper
Language:	English
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

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