Egalitarian distributions in coalitional models: The Lorenz criterion

The paper presents a framework where the most important single-valued solutions in the literature of TU games are jointly analyzed. The paper also suggests that similar frameworks may be useful for other coalitional models.

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Year of publication:	2003-01
Authors:	Aguirre, Arin ; Javier, Francisco
Institutions:	Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales
Subject:	coalitional games \| egalitarian criteria \| prenucleolus \| Shapley value

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	IKERLANAK.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	The text is part of a series Ikerlanak 2003.02 Number 2003-02
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005121345