Election-by-Lot as a Judicial Selection Mechanism

The present paper urges the reader to overcome these barriers to scholarly appreciation, to cast to the side any preliminary skepticism toward election-by-lot as a reasonable allocation mechanism, and to take seriously for the moment, the claim that election-by-lot might be usefully employed in allocating certain judicial functions among a pool of potential candidates, the precise contours of which will be more fully defined shortly

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Year of publication:	2016
Authors:	Bunting, W.C.
Publisher:	[2016]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Theorie \| Theory \| Rechtsprechung \| Court decisions \| Rechtsökonomik \| Economic analysis of law \| Justiz \| Judiciary

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (42 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: NYU Journal of Law & Liberty, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2006 Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments March 1, 2006 erstellt
Classification:	K00 - Law and Economics. General ; K41 - Litigation Process
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012985612