Eliciting traders' knowledge in "frictionless" asset market

Intuitively, a patient trader should be able to make his trading partners compete to reveal whatever information is relevant to their transactions with him. This possibility is examined in the context of a model resembling that of Gale (1986). The main result is that, under assumptions having to do with asset structure and spanning, incentive-compatible elicitation of trading partners’ knowledge is feasible.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	1991
Authors:	Green, Edward J.
Institutions:	Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
Subject:	Game theory

More details

Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Staff Report.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 144
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005712311