ELIMINATION OF ARBITRAGE STATES IN ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION MODELS

In a financial economy with asymmetric information and incomplete markets, we study how agents, having no model of how equilibrium prices are determined, may still refine their information by eliminating sequentially ¡°arbitrage state(s)¡±, namely, the state(s) which would grant the agent an arbitrage, if realizable.

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Year of publication:	2005-02
Authors:	Cornet, Bernard ; Boisdeffre, Lionel De
Institutions:	Department of Economics, University of Kansas
Subject:	Arbitrage \| incomplete markets \| asymmetric information \| information revealed by prices

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	WORKING PAPERS SERIES IN THEORETICAL AND APPLIED ECONOMICS.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Number 200504 9 pages
Classification:	D52 - Incomplete Markets
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005115546