Elinor Ostrom : An Intellectual Biography

Cover -- Half Title -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- Overcoming Prejudice -- Basic Principles of Institutional Economics -- What Are Institutions? -- Transaction Costs -- The Limits of Institutional Design -- The Role of the Expert -- Vincent Ostrom's Contribution to the Alaskan Constitution -- The Expert as a Catalyst of Self-Governance -- Notes -- Chapter One Against Gargantua -- From Ucla To Indiana -- The Complexity of Public Services -- The Rise and Fall of Community Policing -- How Reliable Are Citizens' Surveys? -- The Failure of "Community Policing" -- The Impossibility of Efficient Hierarchical Public Economies -- Control Over the Cause of the Problem -- Accurately Measuring the Demand for Public Goods and the Opportunity Cost of Providing Them -- Fiscal Equivalence and Redistribution -- The Separation of Production and Provision -- Notes -- Chapter Two Polycentricity -- A Few Examples of Large-Scale Polycentric Systems -- The Scientific Community -- Common Law -- Federalism -- Polycentricity as a Framework for the Analysis of Emergent Orders -- Complex Adaptive Systems -- Vincent Ostrom's Polycentricity Conjecture -- Notes -- Chapter Three Escaping the Tragedy of the Commons -- Beyond Markets and Governments -- Civil Society Is a Real Thing -- The Hard Case: Common-Pool Resources -- What are Property Rights? -- Property Is a Bundle of Rights -- Self-Governance Depends on Mechanisms for Monitoring and Enforcing Rules -- Why State Solutions Often Fail -- The Complexity and Limits of Private Property -- Summary -- Bottom-Up Solutions to Social Dilemmas -- From Prisoners' Dilemma to the Stag Hunt -- Beyond the Prisoners' Dilemma Model -- Note -- Chapter Four Resilience -- Conceptualizing Resilience -- An Equilibrium Perspective.