Endogenous cartel formation: Experimental evidence

In a Bertrand-oligopoly experiment, firms choose whether or not to engage in cartel-like communication and, if so, they may get fined by a cartel authority. We find that four-firm industries form cartels more often than duopolies because they gain less from a hysteresis effect after cartel disruption.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Fonseca, Miguel A. ; Normann, Hans-Theo
Institutions:	Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
Subject:	cartels \| collusion \| communication \| experiments \| repeated games

More details

Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	DICE Discussion Papers. - ISSN 2190-9938.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 159
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; C9 - Design of Experiments ; L41 - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010956705