Endogenous choice of the timing of setting incentive parameters and the strategic contracts in a managerial mixed duopoly with a welfare-based delegation contract and a sales delegation contract
Yasuhiko Nakamura
| Year of publication: |
2019
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Nakamura, Yasuhiko |
| Published in: |
Journal of industry, competition and trade. - Dordrecht : Springer, ISSN 1566-1679, ZDB-ID 2067120-9. - Vol. 19.2019, 4, p. 679-737
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| Subject: | Cournot competition | Bertrand competition | Endogenous timing of incentive parameters | Mixed duopoly | Welfare-based delegation | Sales delegation | Duopol | Duopoly | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Kooperative Führung | Participative leadership | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Öffentliches Unternehmen | Public enterprise | Vertrag | Contract |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1007/s10842-018-0291-6 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012313854