Endogenous coalition formation in global pollution control

We extend the work on coalition formation in global pollution control by allowing for multiple coalitions. Equilibrium coalitions are derived under different

Year of publication:	2001
Authors:	Finus, Michael ; Rundshagen, Bianca
Publisher:	Milano : Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Subject:	Umweltabkommen \| Internationale Umweltpolitik \| Verhandlungstheorie \| Koalition \| Theorie \| International environmental agreements \| coalition formation games \| global pollution

More details

Series:	Nota di Lavoro ; 43.2001
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/155206 [Handle]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; Q20 - Renewable Resources and Conservation; Environmental Management. General
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608805

A service of the

FAQ-Assistent (beta)