ENDOGENOUS EFFORTS ON NETWORKS : DOES CENTRALITY MATTER ?

This article explores individual incentives to produce information on communication networks. In our setting, efforts are strategic complements along communication paths with possible decay. We analyze Nash equilibria on the line network. We give conditions under which more central agents provide more efforts for general payofffunctions, and we fully characterize equilibria under geometric decay.

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Year of publication:	2009-01-16
Authors:	Belhaj, Mohamed ; Deroïan, Frédéric
Institutions:	HAL
Subject:	Communication Network \| Endogenous Efforts \| Strategic Complements

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00353872/en/
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008794012