Endogenous information, adverse selection, and prevention : implications for genetic testing policy
Year of publication: |
September 2017
|
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Authors: | Peter, Richard ; Richter, Andreas ; Thistle, Paul D. |
Published in: |
Journal of health economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0167-6296, ZDB-ID 625797-5. - Vol. 55.2017, p. 95-107
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Subject: | Adverse selection | Information value | Insurance | Moral hazard | Prevention | Adverse Selektion | Theorie | Theory | Moral Hazard | Informationswert | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Krankenversicherung | Health insurance | Gentechnik | Genetic engineering |
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